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This paper presents a summary of PeterWalley’s theory of coherent lower previsions. We introduce three representations
of coherent assessments: coherent lower and upper previsions, closed and convex sets of linear previsions, and sets of desir-
able gambles. We show also how the notion of coherence can be used to update our beliefs with new information, and a num-
ber of possibilities tomodel the notion of independence with coherent lower previsions. Next, we comment on the connection
with other approaches in the literature: de Finetti’s and Williams’ earlier work, Kuznetsov’s and Weischelberger’s work on
interval-valued probabilities, Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence and Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic approach. Finally,
we present a brief survey of some applications and summarize the main strengths and challenges of the theory.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper aims at presenting the main facts about the theory of coherent lower previsions. This theory falls
within the subjective approach to probability, where the probability of an event represents our information
about how likely is this event to happen. This interpretation of probability is mostly used in the framework
of decision making, and is sometimes referred to as epistemic probability [30,43].
Subjective probabilities can be given a number of diﬀerent interpretations. One of them is the behavioral
one we consider in this paper: the probability of an event is interpreted in terms of some behaviour that
depends on the appearance of the event, for instance as betting rates on or against the event, or buying
and selling prices on the event.
The main goal of the theory of coherent lower previsions is to provide a number of rationality criteria for
reasoning with subjective probabilities. By reasoning we shall mean here the cognitive process aimed at solving
problems, reaching conclusions or making decisions. The rationality of some reasoning can be characterized
by means of a number of principles and standards that determine the quality of the reasoning. In the case of
probabilistic reasoning, one can consider two diﬀerent types of rationality. The internal one, which studies to
which extent our model is self-consistent, is modelled in Walley’s theory using the notion of coherence. But
there is also an external part of rationality, which studies whether our model is consistent with the available
evidence. The allowance for imprecision in Walley’s theory is related to this type of rationality.
Within the subjective approach to probability, there are two problems that may aﬀect the estimation of the
probability of an event: those of indeterminacy and incompleteness. Indeterminacy, also called indeterminate
uncertainty in [34], happens when there exist events which are not equivalent for our subject, but for which he
has no preference, meaning that he cannot decide if he would bet on one over the other. It can be due for
instance to lack of information, conﬂicting beliefs, or conﬂicting information. On the other hand, incomplete-
ness is due to diﬃculties in the elicitation of the model, meaning that our subject may not be capable of esti-
mating the subjective probability of an event with an arbitrary degree of precision. This can be caused by a
lack of introspection or a lack of assessment strategies, or to the limits of the computational abilities. Both
indeterminacy and incompleteness are a source of imprecision in probability models.
One of the ﬁrst to talk about the presence of imprecision when modelling uncertainty was Keynes in [33],
although therewere already some comments about it in earlierworks byBernoulli andLambert [58].Keynes con-
sidered an ordering between the probability of the diﬀerent outcomes of an experiment which need only be par-
tial. His ideas were later formalized byKoopman in [35–37]. Other works in this directionweremade byBorel [4],
Smith [61], Good [31], Kyburg [43] and Levi [45]. In 1975, Williams [85] made a ﬁrst attempt to make a detailed
study of imprecise subjective probability theory, based on the work that de Finetti had done on subjective prob-
ability [21,23] and considering lower and upper previsions instead of precise previsions. This was developed in
much more detail byWalley in [71], who established the arguably more mature theory that we shall survey here.
The terms indeterminate or imprecise probabilities are used in the literature to refer to any model using
upper or lower probabilities on some domain, i.e., for a model where the assumption of the existence of a
630 E. Miranda / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 628–658precise and additive probability model is dropped. In this sense, we can consider credal sets [45], 2- and n-
monotone set functions [5], possibility measures [15,27,88], p-boxes [29], fuzzy measures [26,32], etc. Our focus
here is on what we shall call the behavioral theory of coherent lower previsions, as developed by Peter Walley
in [71]. We are interested in this model mainly for two reasons: from a mathematical point of view, it subsumes
most of the other models in the literature as particular cases, having therefore a unifying character. On the
other hand, it also has a clear interpretation in terms of acceptable transactions. This interpretation lends itself
naturally to decision making [71, Section 3.9]. Our aim in this paper is to give a gentle introduction to the
theory for the reader who ﬁrst approaches the ﬁeld, and to serve him as a guide on his way through. However,
this work by no means pretends to be an alternative to Walley’s book, and we refer to [71] for a much more
detailed account of the properties we shall present and for a thorough justiﬁcation of the theory.
In order to ease the transition for the interested reader from this survey to Walley’s book, let us give a short
outline of the diﬀerent chapters of the book. The book starts with an introduction to reasoning and behavior
in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 introduces coherent lower and upper previsions, and studies their main properties.
Chapter 3 shows how to coherently extend our assessments, through the notion of natural extension, and pro-
vides also the expression in terms of sets of linear previsions or almost-desirable gambles. Chapter 4 discusses
the assessment and the elicitation of imprecise probabilities. Chapter 5 studies the diﬀerent sources of impre-
cision in probabilities, investigates the adequacy of precise models for cases of complete ignorance and com-
ments on other imprecise probability models. The study of conditional lower and upper previsions starts in
Chapter 6, with the deﬁnition of separate coherence and the coherence of an unconditional and a conditional
lower prevision. This is generalized in Chapter 7 to the case of a ﬁnite number of conditional lower previsions,
focusing on a number of statistical models. Chapter 8 establishes a general theory of natural extension of sev-
eral coherent conditional previsions. Finally, Chapter 9 is devoted to the modelling of the notion of
independence.
In this paper, we shall summarize the main aspects of this book and the relationships between Walley’s the-
ory of coherent lower previsions and some other approaches to imprecise probabilities. The paper is structured
as follows: in Section 2, we present the main features of unconditional coherent lower previsions. We give
three representations of the available information: coherent lower and upper previsions, sets of desirable gam-
bles, and sets of linear previsions, and show how to extend the assessments to larger domains. In Section 3, we
outline how we can use the theory of coherent lower previsions to update the assessments with new informa-
tion, and how to combine information from diﬀerent sources. Thus, we make a study of conditional lower
previsions. Section 4 is devoted to the notion of independence. In Section 5, we compare Walley’s theory with
other approaches to subjective probability: the seminal work of de Finetti, ﬁrst generalized to the imprecise
case by Williams, Kuznetsov’s and Weischelberger’s work on interval-valued probabilities, the Dempster–Sha-
fer theory of evidence, and Shafer and Vovk’s recent work on game-theoretic probability. In Section 6, we
review a number of applications. We conclude the paper in Section 7 with an overview of some questions
and remaining challenges in the ﬁeld.
2. Coherent lower previsions and other equivalent representations
In this section, we present the main facts about coherent lower previsions, their behavioral interpretation
and the notion of natural extension. We show that the information provided by a coherent lower prevision can
also be expressed by means of a set of linear previsions or by a set of desirable gambles. Although this last
approach is arguably better suited to understanding the ideas behind the behavioral interpretation, we have
opted for starting with the notion of coherent lower previsions, because this will help to understand the dif-
ferences with classical probability theory and moreover they will be the ones we use when talking about con-
ditional lower previsions in Section 3. We refer to [20] for an alternative introduction.
2.1. Coherent lower previsions
Consider a non-empty space X, representing the set of outcomes of an experiment. The behavioral theory of
imprecise probabilities provides tools to model our information about the likelihood of the diﬀerent outcomes
in terms of our betting behavior on some gambles that depend on these outcomes. Speciﬁcally, a gamble f on X
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f ðxÞ if the outcome of the experiment is x 2 X. This reward is expressed in units of some linear utility scale,
see [71, Section 2.2] for details. We shall denote byLðXÞ the set of gambles on X.1 A particular case of gam-
bles are the indicators of events, that is, the gambles IA deﬁned by IAðxÞ ¼ 1 if x 2 A and IAðxÞ ¼ 0 otherwise
for some A  X.
Example 1. Jack has made it to the ﬁnal of a TV contest. He has already won 50,000 euros,2 and he can add to
this the amount he gets by playing with The Magic Urn. He must draw a ball from the urn, and he wins or
loses money depending on its color: if he draws a green ball, he gets 10,000 euros; if he draws a red ball, he gets
5000 euros; and if he draws a black ball, he gets nothing. Mathematically, the set of outcomes of the
experiment Jack is going to make (drawing a ball from the urn) is X ¼ fgreen; red; blackg, and the gamble f1
which determines his prize is given by f1ðgreenÞ ¼ 10000, f1ðredÞ ¼ 5000, f1ðblackÞ ¼ 0.
LetK be a set of gambles on X. A lower prevision onK is a functional P :K! R. For any gamble f in
K; P ðf Þ represents a subject’s supremum acceptable buying price for f; this means that he is disposed to pay
P ðf Þ   for the uncertain reward determined by f and the outcome of the experiment, or, in other words, that
the transaction f  P ðf Þ þ , understood as a point-wise operation, is acceptable to him for every  > 0 (how-
ever, nothing is said about whether he would buy f for the price P ðf Þ).3
Given a gamble f we can also consider our subject’s inﬁmum acceptable selling price for f, which we shall
denote by P ðf Þ. It means that the transaction P ðf Þ þ  f is acceptable to him for every  > 0 (but nothing is
said about the transaction P ðf Þ  f ). We obtain in this way an upper prevision Pðf Þ on some set of gambles
K0.
We shall see in Section 2.3 an equivalent formulation of lower and upper previsions in terms of sets of desir-
able gambles. For the time being, and in order to justify the rationality requirements we shall introduce, we
shall only assume the following:
1. A transaction that makes our subject lose utiles, no matter the outcome of the experiment, is not acceptable
for him.
2. If he considers a acceptable transaction, he should also accept any other transaction that gives him a greater
reward, no matter the outcome of the experiment.
3. A positive linear combination of acceptable transactions should also be acceptable.Example 1(cont.). If Jack pays x euros in order to play at The Magic Urn, then the increase in his wealth is
given by 10000 x euros if he draws a green ball, 5000 x euros if he draws a red ball, and of x euros if he
draws a black ball (i.e., he loses x euros in that case). The supremum amount of money that he is disposed to
pay will be his lower prevision for the gamble f1. If for instance he is certain that there are no black balls in the
urn, he should be disposed to pay as much as 5000 euros, because his wealth is not going to decrease, no
matter which color is the ball he draws. And if he has no additional information about the composition of the
urn and wants to be cautious, he will not pay more than 5000 euros, because it could happen that all the balls
in the urn are red, and by paying more than 5000 euros he would end up always losing money.
On the other hand, and after Jack has drawn a ball from the urn, and before he sees the color, he can sell
the unknown prize attached to it to the 2nd ranked player (Kate) for y euros. If Jack does this, his increase in
wealth will be y  10000 euros if the ball is green, y  5000 euros if the ball is red, and y euros if the ball is
black. The minimum amount of money that he requires in order to sell it will be his upper prevision for the
gamble f1. If he knows that there are only red and green balls in the urn, he should accept to sell it for more1 Although Walley’s theory assumes the variables involved be bounded, the theory has also been generalized to unbounded random
variables in [63,62]. The related formulation of the theory from a game-theoretic point of view, as we will present it in Section 5.6, has also
been made for arbitrary gambles. See also Section 5.3.
2 Such an amount of money is only added in order to justify the linearity of the utility scale, which in the case of money only holds if the
amounts at stake are small compared to the subject’s capital.
3 In this paper, we use Walley’s notation of P for lower previsions and P for upper previsions; these can be seen as lower and upper
expectations, and will only be interpreted as lower and upper probabilities when the gamble f is the indicator of some event.
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are green and then by selling it for less that 10,000 euros he would end up losing money, no matter the
outcome.
Since by selling a gamble f for a price l or alternatively by buying the gamble f for the price l our sub-
ject increases his wealth in l f in both cases, it may be argued that he should be disposed to accept these
transactions under the same conditions. Hence, his inﬁmum acceptable selling price for f should agree with
the opposite of his supremum acceptable buying price for f. As a consequence, given a lower prevision
on a set of gambles K we can deﬁne an upper prevision P on K :¼ ff : f 2Kg, by P ðf Þ ¼ P ðf Þ,
and vice versa. Taking this into account, all the developments for lower previsions can also be done for upper
previsions, and vice versa. We shall concentrate in this survey on lower previsions.
Lower previsions are subject to a number of rationality criteria, which assure the consistency of the judge-
ments they represent. First of all, a positive linear combination of a number of acceptable gambles should
never result in a transaction that makes our subject lose utiles, no matter the outcome. This is modeled
through the notion of avoiding sure loss: for every natural number nP 0 and f1; . . . ; fn inK, we should havesup
x2X
Xn
i¼1
½fiðxÞ  PðfiÞP 0:Otherwise, there would exist some d > 0 such that
Pn
i¼1½fiðxÞ  ðP ðfiÞ  dÞ 6 d, meaning that the sum of
acceptable transactions ½fi  ðP ðfiÞ  dÞ results in a loss of at least d, no matter the outcome of the
experiment.
Example 1(cont.). Jack decides to pay 5000 euros in order to play at The Magic Urn. The TV host oﬀers him
also another prize depending on the same outcome: he will win 9000 euros if he draws a black ball, 5000 if he
draws a red ball and nothing if he draws a green ball. Let f2 denote this other prize. Jack decides to pay
additionally as much as 5500 euros to also get this other prize. But then he is paying 10,500 euros, and total
prize he is going to win is 10,000 euros with a green or a red ball, and 9000 euros with a black ball. Hence, he is
going to lose money, no matter the outcome of the experiment. Mathematically, this means that the
assessments P ðf1Þ ¼ 5000 and P ðf2Þ ¼ 5500 incur a sure loss.
But there is a stronger requirement, namely that of coherence. Coherence means that our subject’s supre-
mum acceptable buying price for a gamble f should not be raised by considering a positive linear combination
of a ﬁnite number of other acceptable gambles. Formally, this means that for every non-negative integers n
and m and gambles f0; f1; . . . ; fn in K, we havesup
x2X
Xn
i¼1
½fiðxÞ  PðfiÞ  m½f0ðxÞ  P ðf0ÞP 0: ð1ÞA lower prevision satisfying this condition will in particular avoid sure loss, by considering the particular case
of m ¼ 0.
Let us suppose that Eq. (1) does not hold for some non-negative integers n;m and some f0; . . . ; fn inK. If
m ¼ 0, this means that P incurs in a sure loss, which we have already argued is an inconsistency. Assume then
that m > 0. Then there exists some d > 0 such thatXn
i¼1
½fiðxÞ  ðPðfiÞ  dÞ 6 m½f0ðxÞ  ðP ðxÞ þ dÞfor all x 2 X. The left-hand side is a positive linear combination of acceptable buying transactions, which
should then be acceptable. The right-hand side, which gives a bigger reward than this acceptable transaction,
should be acceptable as well. But this means that our subject should be disposed to buy the gamble f0 at the
price P ðf0Þ þ d, which is greater than the supremum buying price he established before. This is an
inconsistency.
Example 1(cont.). After thinking again, Jack decides to pay as much as 5000 euros for the ﬁrst prize ðf1Þ and
4000 euros for the second ðf2Þ. He also decides that he will sell this second prize to Kate for anything bigger
Table 1
Increase on Jack’s wealth depending on the color of the ball he draws
Green Red Black
Buy f1 for 5000 5000 0 5000
Buy f2 for 4000 4000 1000 5000
Sell f2 for 6000 6000 1000 3000
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P ðf2Þ ¼ 4000, P ðf2Þ ¼ 6000, or, equivalently, P ðf2Þ ¼ 6000. The rise in his wealth is given in Table 1.
These assessments avoid sure loss. However, the ﬁrst one already implies that he should sell f2 for anything
bigger than 5000 euros: if he does so, the increase in his wealth is 5000 euros with a green ball, 0 with a red ball,
and 4000 with a black ball. This situation is better than the one produced by buying f1 for 5000 euros, which
he considered acceptable. This is an inconsistency with his assessment of 6000 euros as inﬁmum acceptable
selling price for f2.
When the domainK of a lower prevision is a linear space, i.e., closed under addition of gambles and mul-
tiplication of gambles by real numbers, coherence takes a simpler form. It can be checked that in that case P is
coherent if and only if the following three axioms hold for all f ; g in K and all k > 0:
(P1) P ðf ÞP inf f [accepting sure gains].
(P2) P ðkf Þ ¼ kP ðf Þ [positive homogeneity].
(P3) P ðf þ gÞP P ðf Þ þ PðgÞ [superlinearity].
A consequence of these axioms is that a convex combination, a lower envelope and a point-wise limit of
coherent lower previsions is again a coherent lower prevision.
A coherent lower prevision deﬁned on indicators of events only is called a coherent lower probability. The
lower probability of an event A can also be seen as our subject’s supremum betting rate on the event, where
betting on A means that he gets 1 if A appears and 0 if it does not; similarly, the upper probability of an event
A can be interpreted as our subject inﬁmum betting rate against the event A. Here, in contradistinction with
the usual approaches to classical probability theory, we start from previsions (of gambles) and deduce the
probabilities (of events), instead of going from probabilities to previsions using some expectation operator
(but see also [83] for a similar approach in the case of precise probabilities).
As Walley himself argues in [71, Section 2.11], the notion of coherence can be considered too weak to fully
characterize the rationality of probabilistic reasoning. Indeed, other additional requirements could be added in
order to achieve this: we may for instance use symmetry or independent principles, or the principle of direct
inference discussed in [71, Section 1.7.2]. In this sense, most of the notions of upper and lower probabilities
considered in the literature (2- and n-monotone capacities, belief functions, necessity measures) are particular
cases of coherent lower previsions. Nevertheless, the main point here is that coherence is a necessary condition
for rationality, and that we should at least require our subject’s assessments to satisfy it. Other possible ratio-
nality axioms, such as the notion of conglomerability, will be discussed later in this paper.
The assessments expressed by means of a lower prevision can also be made in terms of two alternative rep-
resentations: sets of linear previsions and sets of almost-desirable gambles.
2.2. Linear previsions
When the supremum buying price and the inﬁmum selling price for a gamble f coincide, then the common
value P ðf Þ :¼ P ðf Þ ¼ P ðf Þ is called a fair price or prevision for f. More generally, a real-valued function
deﬁned on a set of gambles K is called a linear prevision when for all natural numbers m; n and gambles
f1; . . . ; fm; g1; . . . ; gn in the domain,sup
x2X
Xm
i¼1
½fiðxÞ  PðfiÞ 
Xn
j¼1
½gjðxÞ  P ðgjÞ
" #
P 0: ð2Þ
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some d > 0 such thatg1
g2
g3
g4Xm
i¼1
½fiðxÞ  P ðfiÞ þ d þ
Xn
j¼1
½P ðgjÞ  gj þ d < d ð3Þfor all x 2 X. Since P ðfiÞ is our subject’s supremum acceptable buying price for the gamble fi, he is disposed to
pay P ðfiÞ  d for it, so the transaction fi  P ðfiÞ þ d is acceptable for him; on the other hand, since PðgjÞ is his
inﬁmum acceptable selling price for gj, he is disposed to sell it for the price PðgjÞ þ d, so the transaction
PðgjÞ þ d gj is acceptable. But Eq. (3) tells us that the sum of these acceptable transactions produces a loss
of at least d, no matter the outcome of the experiment!
A linear prevision P is coherent, both when interpreted as a lower and as an upper prevision; the former
means that P :¼ P is a coherent lower prevision on K, the latter that the functional P 1 on
K :¼ ff : f 2Kg given by P 1ðf Þ ¼ Pðf Þ is a coherent lower prevision on K. However, not every
functional which is coherent both as a lower and as an upper prevision is a linear prevision. This is because
coherence as a lower prevision only guarantees that Eq. (2) holds for n 6 1, and coherence as an upper pre-
vision only guarantees that the same equation holds for the case where m 6 1. An example showing that these
two properties do not imply that Eq. (2) holds for all non-negative natural numbers n;m is the following:
Example 2. Let us consider a ﬁve element space X :¼ fx1; x2; x3; x4; x5g, and a functional P deﬁned on a subset
fg1; g2; g3; g4g of LðXÞ such that the gambles gi are given byx1 x2 x3 x4 x5
0 0 1 1 2
0 0 0 2 1
1 0 2 0 0
0 1 0 0 0Consider P given by P ðgiÞ ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1; . . . ; 4. Then it can be checked that P is coherent both as a lower
and as an upper prevision. However, the gamble g1 þ g2  g3  g4 has the constant value 1, and this implies
that Eq. (2) does not hold. Therefore P is not a linear prevision.
As it was the case with the coherence condition for lower previsions, when the domain K satisﬁes some
additional conditions, then Eq. (2) can be simpliﬁed. For instance, if the domainK is self-conjugate, meaning
that K ¼K, then P is a linear prevision if and only if it avoids sure loss and satisﬁes Pðf Þ ¼ Pðf Þ for all
f 2K. On the other hand, when K is a linear space of gambles, then P is a linear prevision if and only if
(P0) P ðf þ gÞ ¼ P ðf Þ þ P ðgÞ for all f ; g 2K.
(P1) P ðf ÞP inf f for all f 2K.
It follows from these two conditions that P also satisﬁes
(P2) P ðkf Þ ¼ kPðf Þ for all f 2K; k > 0.
Hence, when the domain is a linear space of gambles linear previsions are coherent lower previsions which
are additive instead of super-additive.
A linear prevision on a domainK is always the restriction of a linear prevision on all gambles, which is, by
conditions (P0) and (P1), a linear functional onLðXÞ. We shall denote by PðXÞ the set of linear previsions on
X.
Given a linear prevision P on all gambles, i.e., an element of PðXÞ, we can consider its restriction Q to the
set of indicators of events. This restriction can be seen in particular as a functional on the classPðXÞ of subsets
of X, using the identiﬁcation QðAÞ ¼ PðIAÞ. It can be checked that this functional is a ﬁnitely additive prob-
ability, and P is simply the expectation with respect to Q. Hence, in case of linear previsions there is no
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the restriction to events (the probability) determines the value on gambles (the expectation) and vice versa.
This is no longer true in the imprecise case, where there usually are inﬁnitely many coherent extensions of
a coherent lower probability [71, Section 2.7.3], and this is why the theory is formulated in general in terms
of gambles. The fact that lower previsions of events do not determine uniquely the lower previsions of gambles
is due to the fact that we are not dealing with additive functionals anymore.
A linear prevision P whose domain is made up of the indicators of the events in some class A is called an
additive probability onA. If in particularA is a ﬁeld of events, then P is a ﬁnitely additive probability in the
usual sense, and moreover condition 2 simpliﬁes to the usual axioms of ﬁnite additivity:
(a) P ðAÞP 0 for all A in A.
(b) P ðXÞ ¼ 1.
(c) P ðA [ BÞ ¼ PðAÞ þ P ðBÞ whenever A \ B ¼ ;.Example 1(cont.). Assume that Jack knows that there are only 10 balls in the urn, and that the drawing is fair,
so that the probability of each color depends only on the proportion of balls of that color. If he knew the exact
composition of the urn, for instance that there are ﬁve green balls, four red balls and one black ball, then his
expected gain with the gamble f1 would be 0:5  10000 þ 0:4  5000 0:1  0 ¼ 7000 euros, and this should be
his fair price for the gamble. Any linear prevision will be determined by its restriction to events via the
expectation operator. This restriction to events corresponds to some particular composition of the urn: if he
knows that there are four red balls out of 10 in the urn, then his betting rate on or against drawing a red ball
(that is, his fair price for a gamble with reward 1 if he draws a red ball and 0 if he does not) should be 0.4.
We can characterize the coherence of a lower prevision P with domainK by means of its set of dominating
linear previsions, which we shall denote as4 Re
(has th
will no
decisioMðPÞ :¼ fP 2 PðXÞ : P ðf ÞP P ðf Þ for all f in Kg:
It can be checked that P is coherent if and only if it is the lower envelope of MðP Þ, that is, if and only ifP ðf Þ ¼ minfP ðf Þ : P 2MðP Þg
for all f inK. Moreover, the set of dominating linear previsions allows us to establish a one-to-one correspon-
dence between coherent lower previsions P and closed (in the weak-* topology) and convex sets of linear pre-
visions: given a coherent lower prevision P we can consider the (closed and convex) set of linear previsions
MðP Þ. Conversely, every closed and convex setM of linear previsions determines uniquely a coherent lower
prevision P by taking lower envelopes.4 Besides, it can be checked that these two operations (taking lower
envelopes of closed convex sets of linear previsions and considering the linear previsions that dominate a given
coherent lower prevision) commute. We should warn the reader, however, that this equivalence does not hold
in general for the conditional lower previsions that we shall introduce in Section 3, although there exists an
envelope result for the alternative approach developed by Williams that we shall present in Section 5.2.
The representation of coherent lower previsions in terms of sets of linear previsions allows us to give them a
Bayesian sensitivity analysis representation: we may assume that there is a fair price for every gamble f on X,
which results on a linear prevision P 2 PðXÞ, and such that our subject’s imperfect knowledge of P only allows
him to place it among a set of possible candidates,M. Then the inferences he can make fromM are equivalent
to the ones he can make using the lower envelope P of this set. This lower envelope is a coherent lower prevision.
Hence, all the developments we make with (unconditional) coherent lower previsions can also be made with
sets of ﬁnitely additive probabilities, or equivalently with the set of their associated expectation operators,
which are linear previsions. In this sense, there is a strong link between this theory and robust Bayesian anal-mark nonetheless that convexity is not really an issue here, since a set of linear previsions represents the same behavioral dispositions
e same lower and upper envelopes) as its convex hull, and in many cases, the set of linear previsions compatible with some beliefs
t be convex; see [10,13] for more details, and [55] for a more critical approach to the assumption of convexity in the context of
n making.
636 E. Miranda / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 628–658ysis [53]. We shall see in Section 3 that, roughly speaking, this link only holds when we update our information
if we deal with ﬁnite sets of categories.
Example 1(cont.). The lower previsions P ðf1Þ ¼ 5000 and P ðf2Þ ¼ 4000 that Jack established before for the
gambles f1; f2 are coherent. The information P gives is equivalent to its set of dominating linear previsions,
MðP Þ. Any of these linear previsions is characterized by its restriction to events, which gives the probability of
drawing a ball of some particular color. In this case, it can be checked thatTable
The pr
P(Gre
0
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.5MðP Þ :¼ fðp1; p2; p3Þ : p1 P p3; p2 P 4ðp1  p3Þ  p3g;
where p1; p2 and p3 denote the proportions of green, red and black balls in the urn, respectively. This means
that his beliefs about the composition of the urn are that there are at least as many green as black balls, and
that the number of red and black balls is at least four times the diﬀerence of green and black balls.
We see in this example that the actual set of possible compositions of the urns which are compatible with
these beliefs determines the following set of compatible previsions (remember that we are assuming that there
are 10 balls in the urn and that the drawing is fair) (Table 2).
This set is ﬁnite, and therefore non-convex; it provides nonetheless the same behavioral information as its
convex hullMðP Þ. It is also interesting that, as remarked by one of the referees, not all the probabilities in this
table correspond to extreme points of MðP Þ: for instance ð0:4; 0:2; 0:4Þ ¼ 0:8  ð0:5; 0; 0:5Þ þ 0:2  ð0; 1; 0Þ:
We will comment further on linear previsions when we discuss the connection with de Finetti’s work, in
Section 5.1.
2.3. Sets of desirable gambles
An alternative, more direct, representation of the behavioral assessments expressed by a lower prevision can
be made by sets of almost-desirable gambles. A gamble f is said to be almost-desirable when our subject is
almost disposed to accept it, meaning that he considers the gamble f þ  to be desirable for every  > 0
(although nothing is said about the desirability of f).
Following the behavioral interpretation we gave in Section 2.1 to lower previsions, we see that the gamble
f  P ðf Þ must be almost-desirable for our subject: if P ðf Þ is his supremum acceptable buying price, then he
must accept the gamble f  P ðf Þ þ , which means paying Pðf Þ   for the gamble f, for every  > 0. The
lower prevision of f is the maximum value of l such that the gamble f  l is almost-desirable to our subject.
We can also express the requirement of coherence in terms of sets of almost-desirable gambles. Assume
that, out of the gambles inLðXÞ, our subject judges the gambles in D to be almost-desirable. His assessments
are coherent, and we say that D is coherent, if and only if the following conditions hold:
(D0) If f 2 D, then sup f P 0 [avoiding sure loss].
(D1) If inf f > 0, then f 2 D [accepting sure gains].
(D2) If f 2 D; k > 0, then kf 2 D [positive homogeneity].2
evisions compatible with Jack’s beliefs about the composition of the urn and the extraction method
en) P(Red) P(Black)
1 0
0.9 0
0.8 0.1
0.8 0
0.7 0.1
0.6 0.2
0.5 0.2
0.4 0.3
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.4
0.1 0.4
0 0.5
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(D4) If f þ d 2 D for all d > 0, then f 2 D [closure].
Let us give an interpretation of these axioms. D0 states that a gamble f which makes him lose utiles, no
matter the outcome, should not be acceptable for our subject. D1 on the other hand tells that he should accept
a gamble which will always increase his wealth. D2 means that the almost desirability of a gamble f should not
depend on the scale of utility we are considering. D3 states that if two gambles f and g are almost-desirable,
our subject should be disposed to accept their combined transaction. Axioms D0–D3 characterize the so-called
desirable gambles (see [71, Section 2.2.4]). A class of desirable gambles is always a convex cone of gambles.
Axiom D4 is a closure property, and allows us to give an interpretation in terms of almost-desirability.
It is a consequence of axioms (D1) and (D4) that any non-negative gamble f is almost-desirable. From this
and (D3), we can deduce that if a gamble f dominates an almost-desirable gamble g, then f (which is the sum of
the almost-desirable gambles g and f  g) is also almost-desirable. Finally, it follows from (D2) and (D3) that
a positive linear combination of almost-desirable gambles is also almost-desirable. These are the rationality
requirements we have used in Section 2.1 to justify the notion of coherence.
A coherent set of almost-desirable gambles is a closed convex cone containing all non-negative gambles and
not containing any uniformly negative gambles. There is, moreover, a one-to-one correspondence between
coherent lower previsions onLðXÞ and coherent sets of almost-desirable gambles: given a coherent lower pre-
vision P on LðXÞ, the classDP :¼ ff 2LðXÞ : P ðf ÞP 0g ð4Þ
is a coherent set of almost-desirable gambles. Conversely, if D is a coherent set of almost-desirable gambles,
the lower prevision PD given byPDðf Þ :¼ maxfl : f  l 2 Dg ð5Þ
is coherent. Moreover, it can be checked that the operations given in Eqs. (4) and (5) commute, meaning that if
we consider a coherent lower prevision P on LðXÞ and the set DP of almost-desirable gambles that we can
obtain from it via Eq. (4), then the lower prevision PDP that we deﬁne on LðXÞ by Eq. (5) coincides with
P ; and similarly if we start with a set of almost-desirable gambles.
Since the assessments expressed by means of a coherent lower prevision P can also be expressed by means of
its set of dominating linear previsionsMðP Þ, we see that this set is also equivalent to the set of almost-desirable
gambles D we have just derived. Indeed, given a coherent set of almost-desirable gambles D, we can consider
the set of linear previsionsMD :¼ fP 2 PðXÞ : P ðf ÞP 0 for all f in Dg:
MD is a closed and convex set of linear previsions, and its lower envelope P coincides with the coherent lower
prevision induced by D through Eq. (5).
Conversely, given a closed and convex set of linear previsions M, we can consider the set of gamblesDM ¼ ff 2LðXÞ : P ðf ÞP 0 for all P in Mg:
DM is a coherent set of almost-desirable gambles, and the lower prevision PDM it induces is equal to the lower
envelope of M.
Example 1(cont.). From the set of linear previsions MðP Þ compatible with Jack’s coherent assessments, we
obtain the class of almost-desirable gamblesD ¼ fða1; a2; a3Þ : a1 þ a3 P 0; a2 P 0; a1 P maxf4a2;3ða1 þ a2 þ a3Þ;a2  4ða1 þ a3Þgg;
where a1 ¼ f ðgreenÞ; a2 ¼ f ðredÞ; a3 ¼ f ðblackÞ:
Hence, we have three equivalent representations of coherent assessments: coherent lower previsions, closed
and convex sets of linear previsions, and coherent sets of almost-desirable gambles. The use of one or another
of these representations will depend on the context: for instance, a representation in terms of sets of linear pre-
visions may be more useful if we want to give our model a Bayesian sensitivity analysis interpretation, while the
use of sets of almost-desirable gambles may be more interesting in connection when decision making.
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gambles f at the price P ðf Þ: he may accept it, as he does for the price P ðf Þ   for all  > 0, but then he also might
not. Ifwewant to give information about the behavior for P ðf Þ, we have to consider amore informativemodel: sets
of really desirable gambles. These sets allow to distinguish between desirability and almost desirability, and they
solve moreover some of the diﬃculties we shall see in Section 3 when talking about conditioning on sets of prob-
ability zero [77]. We refer to [71, Appendix F] and [20,77] for a more detailed account of this more general model.
2.4. Natural extension
Assume now that our subject has established his acceptable buying prices rates for all gambles on some
domain K. He may then wish to check which are the consequences of these assessments for other gambles.
If for instance he is disposed to pay a price l1 for a gamble f1 and a price l2 for a gamble f2, he should be
disposed to pay at least the price l1 þ l2 for their sum f1 þ f2. In general, given a gamble f which is not in
the domain, he would like to know which is the supremum buying price that he should ﬁnd acceptable for
f, taking into account his previous assessments ðP Þ, and using only the condition of coherence.
Assume that for a given price l there exist gambles g1; . . . ; gn in K and non-negative real numbers
k1; . . . ; kn, such thatf ðxÞ  lP
Xn
i¼1
kiðgiðxÞ  P ðgiÞÞ:Since all the transactions in the sum of the right-hand side are acceptable to him, so should be the left-hand
side, which dominates their sum. Hence, he should be disposed to pay the price l for the gamble f, and there-
fore his supremum acceptable buying price should be greater than or equal to l. To use the language of the
previous section, the right-hand side of the inequality is an almost-desirable gamble, and as a consequence so
must be the gamble on the left-hand side. And the correspondence between almost-desirable gambles and
coherent lower previsions implies then that the lower prevision of f should be greater than, or equal to, l.
The lower prevision that provides these supremum acceptable buying prices is called the natural extension
of P . It is given, for f 2LðXÞ, byEðf Þ ¼ sup
gi2K;kiP0;
i¼1;...;ni ;ni2N
inf
x2X
f ðxÞ 
Xn
i¼1
ki½giðxÞ  P ðgiÞ
( )
: ð6ÞThe reasoning above tells us that our subject should be disposed to pay the price Eðf Þ   for the gamble f, and
this for every  > 0. Hence, his supremum acceptable buying price should dominate Eðf Þ. But we can check
also that this value is suﬃcient to achieve coherence [71, Theorem 3.1.2].
Therefore, Eðf Þ is the smallest, or more conservative, value we can give to the buying price of f in order to
achieve coherence with the assessments in P . There may be other coherent extensions, which may be interest-
ing in some situations; however, any other of these less conservative, coherent extensions will represent stron-
ger assessments than the ones that can be derived purely from P and the notion of coherence. This is why we
usually adopt E as our inferred model.
Coherent lower previsions constitute a very general model for uncertainty: they include for instance as par-
ticular cases 2- and n-monotone capacities, belief functions, or probability measures. In this style, the procedure
of natural extension includes as particular cases many of the extension procedures present in the literature:
Choquet integration of 2- and n-monotone capacities, Lebesgue integration of probability measures, or Bayes’s
rule for updating probability measures. It provides the consequences for other gambles of our previous assess-
ments and the notion of coherence. If for instance we consider a probability measure on some r-ﬁeld of events
A, the natural extension to all events will determine the set of ﬁnitely additive extensions of P to PðXÞ, and it
will be equal to the lower envelope of this set. It coincides moreover with the inner measure of P.
Example 1(cont.). Jack is oﬀered next a new gamble f3, whose reward is 2000 euros if he draws a green ball,
3000 if he draws a red ball, and 4000 euros if he draws a black ball. Taking into account his previous
assessments, P ðf1Þ ¼ 5000; Pðf2Þ ¼ 4000, he should at least pay
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k1;k2P0
minf2000 5000k1 þ 4000k2; 3000 1000k2; 4000þ 5000k1  5000k2g:It can be checked that this supremum is achieved for k1 ¼ 0; k2 ¼ 0:2. We obtain then Eðf3Þ ¼ 2800. This is the
supremum acceptable buying price for f3 that Jack can derive from his previous assessments and the notion of
coherence.
If the lower prevision P does not avoid sure loss, then Eq. (6) yields Eðf Þ ¼ 1 for all f 2LðXÞ. The idea is
that if our subject’s initial assessments are such that he can end up losing utiles no matter the outcome of the
experiment, he will also lose utiles with any other gamble that they oﬀer to him. Because of this, the ﬁrst thing
we have to verify is whether the initial assessments avoid sure loss, and only then we can consider their con-
sequences on other gambles.
When P avoids sure loss, E is the smallest coherent lower prevision on all gambles that dominates P onK,
in the sense that E is coherent and any other coherent lower prevision E0 onLðXÞ such that E0ðf ÞP P ðf Þ for
all f 2K will satisfy E0ðf ÞP Eðf Þ for all f in LðXÞ. E is not in general an extension of P ; it will only be so
when P is coherent itself. Otherwise, the natural extension will correct the assessments present in P into the
smallest possible coherent lower prevision. Hence, the notion of natural extension can be used to modify
the initial assessments into other assessments that satisfy the notion of coherence, and it does so in the
least-committal way, i.e., it provides the smallest coherent lower prevision with the same property.
Example 1(cont.). Let us consider again the assessments P ðf1Þ ¼ 5000, P ðf2Þ ¼ 4000 and P ðf2Þ ¼ 6000. These
imply the acceptable buying transactions in Table 1, which, as we showed, avoid sure loss but are incoherent.
If we apply Eq. (6) to them we obtain that their natural extension is Eðf1Þ ¼ 5000, Eðf2Þ ¼ 4000, Eðf2Þ ¼ 5000.
Hence, it is a consequence of coherence that Jack should be disposed to sell the gamble f2 for anything bigger
than 5000 euros.
The natural extension of the assessments given by a coherent lower prevision P can also be calculated in
terms of the equivalent representations we have given in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Consider a coherent lower prevision P with domainK, and let DP be the set of almost-desirable gambles
associated with the lower prevision P by Eq. (4):DP :¼ ff 2K : P ðf ÞP 0g:
The natural extension EDP of DP provides the smallest set of almost-desirable gambles that contains DP and is
coherent. It is the closure (in the supremum norm topology) off : 9fj 2 DP ; kj > 0 such that f P
Xn
j¼1
kjfj
( )
; ð7Þwhich is the smallest convex cone that contains DP and all non-negative gambles. Then the natural extension
of P to all gambles is given byEðf Þ ¼ supfl : f  l 2 EDP g:
If we consider the set MðP Þ of linear previsions that dominate P on K, thenEðf Þ ¼ minfP ðf Þ : P 2MðP Þg: ð8Þ
This last expression also makes sense if we consider the Bayesian sensitivity analysis interpretation we have
given to coherent lower previsions in Section 2.2: there is a linear prevision modelling our subject’s informa-
tion, but his imperfect knowledge of it makes him consider a set of linear previsionsMðPÞ, whose lower enve-
lope is P . If he wants to extend P to a bigger domain, he should consider all the linear previsions inMðP Þ as
possible models (he has no additional information allowing to disregard any of them), or equivalently their
lower envelope. He obtains then that MðP Þ ¼MðEÞ.
The procedure of natural extension preserves the equivalence between the diﬀerent representations of our
assessments: if we consider for instance a coherent lower prevision P withK and the set of almost-desirable gam-
blesDP we derive from Eq. (4), then we can consider the natural extension ofDP via Eq. (7). The coherent lower
previsionwe can derive from this set of acceptable gambles using Eq. (5) coincides with the natural extensionE of
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bles determines the least-committal extension of our initial model that satisﬁes the notion of coherence.
On the other hand, we can also consider the natural extension of a lower prevision P from a domainK to a
bigger domainK1 (not necessarily equal toLðXÞ). It can be checked then that the procedure of natural exten-
sion is transitive, in the following sense: if E1 denotes the natural extension of P toK1 and we later consider
the natural extension E2 of E1 to some bigger domainK2 K1, then E2 agrees with the natural extension of P
fromK toK2: in both cases we are only considering the behavioral consequences of the assessments onK
and the condition of coherence. This is easiest to see using Eq. (8): we have MðE1Þ ¼MðE2Þ ¼MðP Þ.
3. Updating and combining information
So far, we have assumed that the only information that our subject possesses about the outcome of the
experiment is that it belongs to the set X. But it may happen that, after he has made his assessments, he comes
to have some additional information about this outcome, for instance that it belongs to some element of a
partition B of X. He then has to update his assessments, and the way to do this is by means of what we shall
call conditional lower previsions.
3.1. Conditional lower previsions
Let B be a subset of the sampling space X, and consider a gamble f on X. Walley’s theory of coherent lower
previsions gives two diﬀerent interpretations of Pðf jBÞ: the updated and the contingent one. The most natural
in our view is the contingent interpretation, under which P ðf jBÞ is our subject’s current supremum buying
price for the gamble f contingent on B, that is, the supremum value of l such that the gamble IBðf  lÞ is
desirable for our subject.
In order to relate our subject’s current dispositions on a gamble f contingent on B with his dispositions
towards this gamble if he later shall come to know whether the outcome of the experiment belongs to B, Wal-
ley introduces the so-called updating principle. We say a gamble f is B-desirable for our subject when he is cur-
rently disposed to accept f provided he later observes that the outcome belongs to B. Then the updating
principle requires that a gamble is B-desirable if and only if IBf is desirable. In this way, we can relate the
current and future dispositions of our subject.
Under the updated interpretation of conditional lower previsions, P ðf jBÞ is the subject’s supremum accept-
able buying price he would pay for the gamble f now if he came to know later that the outcome belongs to the
set B, and nothing more. It coincides with the value determined by the contingent interpretation of Pðf jBÞ
because of the updating principle.
Let B be a partition of our sampling space, X, and consider an element B of this partition. This partition
could be for instance a class of categories of the set of outcomes. Assume that our subject has given condi-
tional assessments P ðf jBÞ for all gambles f on some domainHB. As it was the case for (unconditional) lower
previsions, we should require that these assessments are consistent with each other. We say that the condi-
tional lower prevision P ðjBÞ is separately coherent when the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
(SC1) It is coherent as an unconditional prevision, i.e.,sup
x2X
Xn
i¼1
½fiðxÞ  PðfijBÞ  m½f0ðxÞ  P ðf0jBÞP 0 ð9Þfor all non-negative integers n;m and all gambles f0; . . . ; fn in HB;
(SC2) the indicator function of B belongs to HB and P satisﬁes P ðBjBÞ ¼ 1.
The coherence requirement (9) can be given a behavioral interpretation in the same way as with (uncondi-
tional) coherence in Eq. (1): if it does not hold for some non-negative integers n;m and gambles f0; . . . ; fn in
HB, then it can be checked that either: (i) the almost-desirable gamble
Pn
i¼1½fi  P ðfijBÞ incurs in a sure loss
(if m ¼ 0) or (ii) we can raise Pðf0jBÞ in some positive quantity d, contradicting our interpretation of it as his
supremum acceptable buying price (if m > 0).
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require it to be equal to one means just that our subject should bet at all odds on the occurrence of the event
B after having observed it.
In this way, we can obtain separately coherent conditional lower previsions P ðjBÞ with domainsHB for all
events B in the partition B. It is a consequence of separate coherence that the conditional lower prevision
P ðf jBÞ does only depend on the values that f takes on B, i.e, for every two gambles f and g such that
f ðxÞ ¼ gðxÞ for all x 2 B, we should have P ðf jBÞ ¼ P ðgjBÞ. This property implies that all the domains HB
can be extended to the common domainH :¼ ff ¼PB2BfB : fB 2HB 8Bg, and we can deﬁne onH a con-
ditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ by5 Th
for moP ðf jBÞ :¼
X
B2B
IBP ðf jBÞ;i.e., the gamble on X that assumes the value P ðf jBÞ on all elements of B. This conditional lower prevision is
then called separately coherent when P ðjBÞ is separately coherent for all B 2 B. It provides the updated supre-
mum buying price after learning that the outcome of the experiment belongs to some particular element of B.
We shall later use the notationGðf jBÞ :¼ IBðf  P ðf jBÞÞ; Gðf jBÞ :¼
X
B2B
Gðf jBÞ ¼ f  Pðf jBÞ: ð10ÞWhen the domain H of PðjBÞ is a linear space containing all constant gambles, then separate coherence is
equivalent to:
(C1) P ðf jBÞP infx2Bf ðxÞ.
(C2) P ðkf jBÞ ¼ kP ðf jBÞ.
(C3) P ðf þ gjBÞP P ðf jBÞ þ P ðgjBÞ
for all positive real k;B 2 B and gambles f ; g in H. The ﬁrst requirement shows that the conditional lower
prevision on B should only depend on the behavior of f on this set; conditions (C2) and (C3) are the counter-
parts of the requirements (P2) and (P3) we made for unconditional lower previsions, respectively.
Example 1(cont.). For the gambles f1 and f2 whose reward in terms of the color of the ball drawn is given in
Table 3.
Jack had established the coherent assessments Pðf1Þ ¼ 5000 and P ðf2Þ ¼ 4000. But he may also establish
now his supremum acceptable buying prices for these gambles depending on some future information on the
color of the ball drawn. If for instance he is informed that the ball drawn is not green, Jack should update his
lower prevision for the gamble f2, because he is sure that in that case he would get at least a prize of 5000 euros
out of it. On the other hand, if he keeps the supremum buying prize of 5000 euros for f1 he is implying that he
is sure that the ball that has been drawn is red once he comes to know that it is not green.
If for instance he considers as possible models the ones in Table 2 and updates them using Bayes’s rule, then
the updated supremum buying prices he should give by taking lower envelopes would be P ðf1jnot greenÞ ¼ 0
and P ðf2jnot greenÞ ¼ 5000.53.2. Coherence of a ﬁnite number of conditional lower previsions
In practice, it is not uncommon to have lower previsions conditional on diﬀerent partitionsB1; . . . ;Bn of X.
We can think for instance of diﬀerent sets of categories, or of information provided in a sequential way. We
end up then with a ﬁnite number of conditional lower previsions P ðjB1Þ; . . . ; P ðjBnÞ with respective domains
H1; . . . ;Hn LðXÞ, which we shall assume are separately coherent.is is an instance of a procedure called regular extension, that can sometimes be used to coherently update beliefs; see [71, Appendix J]
re details.
Table 3
Increase on Jack’s wealth depending on the color of the ball he draws
Green Red Black
f1 10000 5000 0
f2 0 5000 9000
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ments we have to verify that they are consistent with each other. And again, by ‘consistent’ we shall mean that
a combination of acceptable buying prices should neither lead to a sure loss, nor to an increase of the suppos-
edly supremum acceptable buying price for a gamble f.
To see which form coherence takes now, we need to introduce the second pillar of Walley’s theory of con-
ditional previsions (the other is the updating principle): the conglomerative principle. This rationality principle
requires that if a gamble is B-desirable for every set B in a partitionB of X, then f is also desirable. Taking into
account the updating principle, this means that if IBf is desirable for every B in B, then f should be desirable.
It follows from this principle that for every gamble f in the domain of P ðjBÞ, the gamble Gðf jBÞ given by
Eq. (10) should be almost-desirable. This is the basis of the following deﬁnition of coherence. For simplicity,
we shall assume that the domainsH1; . . . ;Hn are linear spaces of gambles. A possible generalization to non-
linear domains can be found in [46]. Given fi 2Hi, we shall denote by SiðfiÞ :¼ fB 2 Bi : IBfi 6¼ 0g the Bi-sup-
port of fi. It is the set of elements of Bi where fi is not identically zero. It follows from the separate coherence
of P ðjBiÞ that P ð0jBiÞ ¼ 0 for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, and as a consequence the gamble P ðf jBiÞ (or Gðf jBiÞ, for that
matter) is identically zero outside SiðfiÞ.
We say that P ðjB1Þ; . . . ; P ðjBnÞ are (jointly) coherent when for all fi 2Hi; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n and all
f0 2Hj;B0 2 Bj for some j 2 f1; . . . ; ng,sup
x2B
Xn
i¼1
GðfijBiÞ  Gðf0jB0Þ
" #
ðxÞP 0 ð11Þfor some B 2 fB0g [
Sn
i¼1SiðfiÞ.
Assume that Eq. (11) does not hold. Then, there is some d > 0 such that Gðf0jB0Þ þ IB0d dominates the
almost-desirable gamble
Pn
i¼1GðfijBiÞ on every B 2 fB0g [
Sn
i¼1SiðfiÞ. As a consequence, the gamble
Gðf0jB0Þ þ IB0d should also be almost-desirable, and this means that P ðf jB0Þ þ d should be an acceptable buy-
ing price for f, contingent on B0. This is an inconsistency.
Remark 1. The sum
Pn
i¼1GðfijBiÞ  Gðf0jB0Þ in the left-hand side in Eq. (11) is identically zero outside the
union of the sets in the family fB0g [
Sn
i¼1SiðfiÞ. Hence, if in Eq. (11) we consider the supremum over all X (a
condition called weak coherence by Walley [71, Section 7.1.4]) instead of over the sets in the family
fB0g [
Sm
i¼1SiðfiÞ, the condition will be automatically satisﬁed whenever the union of these sets is not equal to
X, no matter how inconsistent these assessments are with each other. This is one of the reasons to consider this
stronger version as our deﬁnition of coherence. See [71, Example 7.3.5] for other undesirable properties of
weak coherence.3.2.1. Natural extension of conditional lower previsions
Assume then that our subject has provided a ﬁnite number of (separately and jointly) coherent lower pre-
visions P ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PðjBnÞ deﬁned on respective linear subsetsH1; . . . ;Hn ofLðXÞ. Then he may wish to see
which are the behavioral implications of these assessments on gambles which are not in the domain. The way
to do this is through the notion of natural extension. Given f 2LðXÞ and B0 2 Bi;Eðf jB0Þ is deﬁned as the
supremum value of l for which there are fi 2Hi such thatsup
x2B
Xn
i¼1
GðfijBiÞ  IB0ðf  lÞ
" #
ðxÞ < 0 ð12Þfor all B in the class fB0g [ [ni¼1SiðfiÞ.
E. Miranda / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 628–658 643In the particular case where we only have an unconditional lower prevision, i.e., when n ¼ 1 and B1 ¼ fXg,
this notion coincides with the unconditional natural extension we introduced in Section 2.4. If we have a num-
ber of conditional lower previsions P ðjB1Þ; . . . ; P ðjBnÞ, we can calculate their natural extensions
EðjB1Þ; . . . ;EðjBnÞ to all gambles using Eq. (12). If the partitions B1; . . . ;Bn are ﬁnite, then these natural
extensions share some of the properties of the unconditional natural extension:
1. They coincide with PðjB1Þ; . . . ; P ðjBnÞ if and only if these conditional lower previsions are coherent.
2. They are the smallest coherent extensions of P ðjB1Þ; . . . ; P ðjBnÞ to all gambles.
3. They are the lower envelope of a family of coherent conditional linear previsions, fP cðjB1Þ; . . . ;
P cðjBnÞ : c 2 Cg.
Hence, when the partitions are ﬁnite, the notion of natural extension of a number of conditional lower pre-
vision also provides us with the consequences of the assessments present on these previsions and the notion of
(joint) coherence, to all gambles in the domain, and it can also be given a Bayesian sensitivity analysis inter-
pretation. This is interesting for many applications, where we must deal with ﬁnite spaces only; however, there
are also interesting situations, such as parametric inference, where we must deal with inﬁnite spaces and where
we end up with partitions that have an inﬁnite number of diﬀerent elements. In that case, it is easy to see that
in order to achieve coherence, P ðf jB0Þ must be at least as large as the supremum l that satisﬁes Eq. (12) for
some fi 2Hi; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. However, and unlike the case of ﬁnite partitions, we cannot guarantee that these
values provide coherent extensions of P ðjB1Þ; . . . ; P ðjBnÞ to all gambles: in general these will only be lower
bounds of all the coherent extensions. Indeed, when the partitions are inﬁnite, we can have a number of
problems:
1. There may be no coherent extensions, and as a consequence the natural extensions may not be coherent [71,
Sections 6.6.6 and 6.6.7].
2. Even if the smallest coherent extensions exist, they may diﬀer from the natural extensions, which are not
coherent [71, Section 8.1.3].
3. The minimal coherent extensions, and as a consequence also the natural extensions, may not be lower enve-
lopes of coherent linear collections [71, Sections 6.6.9 and 6.6.10].
The natural extensions are the minimal coherent extensions of the lower previsions P ðjB1Þ; . . . ; P ðjBnÞ if
and only if they are jointly coherent themselves. But we need some additional conditions to guarantee the joint
coherence of EðjB1Þ; . . . ;EðjBnÞ. One of these conditions is that all the partitions Bi are ﬁnite. But even when
the partitions are inﬁnite it may happen that we are able to characterize the minimal coherent extensions, but
they diﬀer from the natural extensions. One of the reasons for this defective behaviour of the natural extension
in the conditional case is the notion of conglomerability, that we shall treat in detail in the following section,
and that becomes trivial in the case where the partitions are ﬁnite.
Example 3. An example where the natural extension fails to provide the minimal coherent extensions is given
in [48, Example 1]. Let us consider the possibility space X ¼ X1 X2, where X1 ¼ X2 ¼ ½0; 1, and the
partition B ¼ fBx1 : x1 2 X1g, where Bx1 :¼ fx1g X2. Let K ¼ fkp1 : k 2 Rg andH ¼ fgp2 : g 2LðX1Þg,
where the gamble kp1 is deﬁned by kp1ðx1; x2Þ ¼ kx1, and the gamble gp2 by gp2ðx1; x2Þ ¼ gðx1Þx2. Let us deﬁne
the linear (and therefore coherent lower) prevision P on K byP ðkp1Þ ¼ k;
and the conditional linear prevision P ðjBÞ on H byP ðgp2jBx1Þ ¼ gðx1Þ
for all x1 in X1. Then it can be checked that P and P ðjBÞ are coherent. Given the gamble f on X, given byf ðx1; x2Þ ¼
0 if ðx1; x2Þ ¼ ð1 1n ; 1 1nÞ for some n > 0;
1 otherwise;

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est coherent extensions M ;MðjBÞ of P ; P ðjBÞ can be calculated, and we obtain Mðf Þ ¼ 1. The reason for this
discrepancy is that E only gives an extension of P which is coherent with P ðjBÞ; if we also want to extend
PðjBÞ to all gambles the natural extension may not guarantee coherence.
This example provides an instance of the marginal extension of a number of conditional and unconditional
lower previsions. When these previsions are conditioning on a sequence of increasingly ﬁner partitions, the
marginal extension can be used to determine the smallest coherent extensions to all gambles. See [71, Section
6.7.2] and [48] for more information.
3.3. Coherence of an unconditional and a conditional lower prevision
Let us consider in more detail the case where we have a conditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ on some domain
H and an unconditional lower prevision P on some set of gamblesK. Assume that they satisfy the following
conditions:
(a) K;H are linear subspaces of LðXÞ.
(b) Given f 2H, the gambles P ðf jBÞ and IBf belong to H for all B 2 B.
(c) P ðjBÞ is separately coherent on H and P is coherent on K.
As Walley points out, the ﬁrst two assumptions are made for mathematical convenience only; (b) can be
assumed without loss of generality [71, Section 6.3.1], and the results can be extended to situations where
(a) does not hold [46]. Note that the unconditional lower prevision can be seen as a conditional lower prevision
by simply considering the partition {X}, and then Eq. (10) becomes Gðf Þ ¼ f  P ðf Þ.
The lower previsions P and P ðjBÞ are jointly coherent, i.e., they satisfy Eq. (11), if and only if
(JC1) supx2X½Gðf1Þ þ Gðg1jBÞ  Gðf2ÞP 0
(JC2) supx2X½Gðf1Þ þ Gðg1jBÞ  Gðg2jB0ÞP 0
for all f1; f2 2K; g1; g2 2H and B0 2 B. These conditions can be simpliﬁed under some additional assump-
tions on the domains (see [71, Section 6.5] for details).
Again, it can be checked that if any of these conditions fails, the assessments of our subject produce incon-
sistencies. Assume ﬁrst that (JC1) does not hold. If f2 ¼ 0, then we have a sum of acceptable transactions that
produces a sure loss. If f2 6¼ 0, then there is some d > 0 such that the gamble Gðf2Þ  d dominates the desirable
gamble Gðf1Þ þ Gðg1jBÞ þ d. This means that our subject is willing to increase his supremum acceptable buy-
ing price for f2 in d, a contradiction.
Similarly, if (JC2) does not hold and g2 ¼ 0 we have a sum of acceptable transactions that produces a sure
loss; and if g2 6¼ 0 there is some d > 0 such that Gðg2jB0Þ  d dominates Gðf1Þ þ Gðg1jBÞ þ d and is therefore
desirable. Hence, our subject should be willing to pay P ðg2jB0Þ þ d for g2 contingent on B0, a contradiction.
It is a consequence of the joint coherence of P , P ðjBÞ that, given f 2H and B 2 B;
PðGðf jBÞÞ ¼ P ðIBðf  P ðf jBÞÞÞ ¼ 0, where Gðf jBÞ is deﬁned in Eq. (10). When PðBÞ > 0, there is a unique
value l such that P ðIBðf  lÞÞ ¼ 0, and therefore this l must be the conditional lower prevision P ðf jBÞ. This
is called the Generalised Bayes Rule (GBR). This rule has a number of interesting properties:
1. It is a generalization of Bayes’s rule in classical probability theory.
2. If PðBÞ > 0 and we deﬁne P ðf jBÞ via the Generalized Bayes Rule, then it is the lower envelope of the con-
ditional linear previsions P ðf jBÞ that we can deﬁne using Bayes’s rule on the elements of MðP Þ.
3. When the partition B is ﬁnite and P ðBÞ > 0 for all B 2 B, then the GBR uniquely determines the condi-
tional lower prevision P ðjBÞ.Example 4. Three horses (a, b and c) take part in a race. Our a priori lower probability for each horse being
the winner is P ðfagÞ ¼ 0:1; P ðfbgÞ ¼ 0:25; P ðfcgÞ ¼ 0:3; Pðfa; bgÞ ¼ 0:4; P ðfa; cgÞ ¼ 0:6; P ðfb; cgÞ ¼ 0:7. Since
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lower probabilities for that case using the Generalised Bayes Rule. Taking into account that we are dealing
with ﬁnite spaces and that the conditioning event has positive lower probability, applying the Generalised
Bayes Rule is equivalent to taking the lower envelope of the linear conditional previsions that we obtain
applying Bayes’s rule on the elements of MðP Þ. Thus, we obtain:P ðfagjfa; bgÞ ¼ inf P ðfagÞ
P ðfa; bgÞ : P 2MðP Þ
 
¼ 0:1=0:5 ¼ 0:2;
P ðfbgjfa; bgÞ ¼ inf P ðfbgÞ
P ðfa; bgÞ : P 2MðP Þ
 
¼ 0:25=0:55 ¼ 0:45:We saw in the previous section that a number of conditional lower previsions may be coherent and still have
some undesirable properties, when the partitions are inﬁnite. Something similar applies to the case where we
have only a conditional and an unconditional lower prevision. For instance, a coherent pair P ; P ðjBÞ is not
necessarily the lower envelope of coherent pairs of linear unconditional and conditional previsions, P ; P ðjBÞ
(these even may not exist). On the other hand, there are linear previsions P for which there is no conditional
linear prevision P ðjBÞ such that P ; P ðjBÞ are coherent in the sense of Eq. (11), i.e., linear previsions that can-
not be updated in a coherent way to a linear conditional prevision P ðjBÞ, but which can be updated to a con-
ditional lower prevision.
Taking this into account, given an unconditional prevision P representing our subject’s beliefs and a par-
tition B of X, he may be interested in considering the conditional lower previsions P ðjBÞ which are coherent
with P , i.e., those for which conditions (JC1) and (JC2) are satisﬁed. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the existence of such P ðjBÞ is that P isB-conglomerable: this is the case when given distinct sets B1;B2; . . . inB
such that P ðBnÞ > 0 for all n and a gamble f such that P ðIBnf ÞP 0 for all n, it holds that P ðI[nBnf ÞP 0.
The condition of B-conglomerability holds trivially when the partition B is ﬁnite, or when P ðBÞ ¼ 0 for
every set B in the partition. It only becomes non-trivial when we consider a partition B for which there are
inﬁnitely many elements B satisfying P ðBÞ > 0. It makes sense as a rationality axiom once we accept the updat-
ing and conglomerability principles: to see this, consider that if fBngn is a partition of X with P ðBnÞ > 0 and
P ðIBnf ÞP 0, then for every d > 0 the gamble IBnðf þ dÞ is desirable. The updating and conglomerative prin-
ciples imply then that f þ d is desirable, whence P ðf þ dÞP 0. Since this holds for all d > 0, we deduce that
P ðf ÞP 0.
More generally, Walley says that a coherent lower prevision P is fully conglomerable when it is B-conglo-
merable for every partition B. A full conglomerable coherent lower prevision can be coherently updated to a
conditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ for any partitionB of X. Again, full conglomerability can be accepted as an
axiom of rationality provided we accept the updating and conglomerability principles, and also provided that
when we deﬁne our coherent lower prevision we want to be able to updated for all possible partitions of our set
of values.
There is an important connection between full conglomerability and countable additivity: given a linear
prevision P on LðXÞ taking inﬁnitely many values, it is fully conglomerable if and only for every countable
partition fBngn of X it satisﬁes
P
nP ðBnÞ ¼ 1.
Full conglomerability is one of the points of disagreement between Walley’s and de Finetti’s work, that we
shall present in more detail in Section 5.1. De Fintetti rejects the assumption of countable additivity on prob-
abilities, and taking into account the above relationship also the property of full conglomerability. One key
observation here is that de Finetti does not assume the conglomerative principle as a rationality axiom,
and full conglomerability can be seen as a consequence of it.
When P is B-conglomerable and B 2 B, the conditional lower prevision P ðf jBÞ is uniquely determined by
the Generalised Bayes Rule if PðBÞ > 0. If P ðBÞ ¼ 0, however, there is not a unique value for P ðf jBÞ for which
we achieve coherence. The smallest conditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ which is coherent with P is the vacuous
conditional prevision, given by Pðf jBÞ ¼ infx2Bf ðxÞ, and if we want to have more informative assessments we
may need some additional assumptions. Indeed, the approach to conditioning on sets of probability zero is
one of the diﬀerences in the approach to conditioning by Walley (and also by de Finetti and Williams) and
that by Kolmogorov. In Kolmogorov’s approach, conditioning is made on a r-ﬁeldA, and a conditional pre-
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ble g. In particular, if we consider an event B of probability zero, Kolmogorov allows the prevision P ðjBÞ to
be completely arbitrary. Walley’s coherence condition is more general because it can be applied on previsions
conditional on partitions, and is more restrictive when dealing with sets of probability zero than Kolmogo-
rov’s (although it may be argued that it also makes more sense). In particular, for a given linear prevision
P there may not exist linear conditional previsions which are coherent with P.
One interesting approach to conditioning on sets of probability zero in a coherent setting is the use of zero-
layers by Coletti and Scozzafava [8, Chapter 12], which also appears in some earlier work by Krauss [38].
Their approach to conditioning is nevertheless slightly diﬀerent from Walley, since they consider conditional
previsions as previsions whose domain is a class of conditional events. See [6–8] for further information on
Coletti and Scozzafava’s work, and [71, Section 6.10] and [78, Section 1.4] for further details on Walley’s
approach to conditioning on events of lower probability zero.
4. Independence
Next, we see how we can deﬁne the concept of independence in the context of coherent lower previsions. Let
us consider two random variables X 1;X 2 taking values in respective sets X1;X2. In the classical setting, we call
the two variables (stochastically) independent when, given the probability measure P that models the value
that ðX 1;X 2Þ assume jointly, any of the following conditions holds6
(a) P ðX 1 ¼ x1;X 2 ¼ x2Þ ¼ P ðX 1 ¼ x1Þ  P ðX 2 ¼ x2Þ for all x1 2 X1; x2 2 X2 [decomposition].
(b) P ðX 1 ¼ x1jX 2 ¼ x2Þ ¼ P ðX 1 ¼ x1Þ for all x1 2 X1; x2 2 X2 [marginalization].Remark 2. These two conditions are equivalent provided the marginal distributions are everywhere non-zero,
that is, provided we are not conditioning on sets of probability zero. But if P ðX 2 ¼ x2Þ ¼ 0 for instance, then
condition (a) holds trivially, while there are many values of P ðX 1 ¼ x1jX 2 ¼ x2Þ for which condition (b) may
not hold, and this even under the more restrictive treatment of conditioning of sets of probability zero that we
presented in the previous section. To simplify this section, we shall assume throughout that the conditioning
events have all positive lower probability.
Provided we are conditioning on sets of positive probability, independence is a symmetrical notion: if (b)
holds, then we also have6 In
density
7 Alt
can beP ðX 2 ¼ x2jX 1 ¼ x1Þ ¼ P ðX 2 ¼ x2Þ
for all x1 2 X1; x2 2 X2.
When our knowledge about the value that ðX 1;X 2Þ assume jointly is represented by means of a coherent
lower prevision P onLðX1 X2Þ, there is no unique way of extending the notion of independence. The prop-
erties of decomposition and marginalization are no longer equivalent, and moreover symmetry is not immedi-
ate anymore, meaning that we must distinguish between irrelevance (an asymmetrical notion) and
independence (its symmetric counterpart). On the other hand, all our deﬁnitions must be made in terms of vari-
ables and not of events, since events do not keep all the information about the coherent lower prevision P .
In this section, we shall present some of the generalizations proposed in the literature and the relationships
between them. To ﬁx things, consider a coherent lower prevision P on LðX1 X2Þ representing our knowl-
edge about the value that X 1;X 2 assume jointly.
7 We shall assume throughout that these two variables are
logically independent, meaning that the joint variable ðX 1;X 2Þ can assume any value in the product space
X1 X2. Our information about the random variable X 1 is given by the marginal lower prevision P 1, whereP 1ðf Þ ¼ Pðf^ Þthis deﬁnition we assume that the setsX1;X2 are ﬁnite in order to simplify the notation; in the inﬁnite case we would simply consider
functions instead of probability mass functions. We also use X 1 ¼ x1 for denoting the event X11 ðfx1gÞ to simplify the notation.
hough here we are assuming for simplicity that the domain of P isLðX1 X2Þ, all the developments we shall make in this section
generalized to the case where the domain of P is some subsetK of LðX1 X2Þ.
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called X1-measurable). Similarly, we can express our information about the outcome of X 2 by means of a
coherent lower prevision P 2 on LðX2Þ, given byP 2ðgÞ ¼ P ðg^Þ
for all g 2LðX2Þ, where g^ is the gamble given by g^ðx1; x2Þ ¼ gðx2Þ for all ðx1; x2Þ in X1 X2. We shall also
assume that we have conditional lower previsions P ðjX 1Þ; PðjX 2Þ on LðX1 X2Þ such that P ; P ðjX 1Þ and
P ðjX 2Þ are jointly coherent (i.e., they satisfy Eq. (11)). These conditional lower previsions represent our beliefs
about the outcome of one of the experiments provided we observe the outcome of the other. P ðjX 1Þ is a lower
prevision conditional on the partition fX 1 ¼ x1 : x1 2 X1g of X, and similarly PðjX 2Þ is a lower prevision con-
ditional on the partition fX 2 ¼ x2 : x2 2 X2g of X. To simplify the notation we shall sometimes use P ðjx1Þ to
denote P ðjX 1 ¼ x1Þ and P ðjx2Þ to denote P ðjX 2 ¼ x2Þ for any x1 2 X1; x2 2 X2.
In the examples we shall consider in this section we shall deal with ﬁnite spaces only, and the conditioning
events shall always have positive lower probability; this will simplify the calculations of the conditional lower
probabilities, because (i) they will be uniquely determined by the Generalised Bayes Rule and (ii) they will also
be the lower envelope of the conditional precise probabilities that can be obtained by applying Bayes’s rule to
the set of compatible (precise) models.
4.1. Epistemic irrelevance
The ﬁrst generalization of the concept of independence to imprecise probabilities is based on the margin-
alization property, and is called epistemic irrelevance. We say that the experiment X 1 is epistemically irrelevant
for X 2 when our beliefs about the value that X 2 takes do not change after we learn the value that X 1 has taken.
Formally, this holds if and only ifP ðf jX 1 ¼ x1Þ ¼ P 2ðf Þ
for all X2-measurable gambles f, and all x1 2 X1.
The notion of epistemic irrelevance can also be deﬁned in terms of sets of linear previsions [10,11]: we say
that X 1 is epistemically irrelevant for X 2 whenfP 2ðjx1Þ : P 2 2MðPÞg ¼MðP 2Þ
for all x1 inX1, i.e., when learning the outcome about the ﬁrst experiment does not change our uncertainty (the
set of possible precise models) about the second experiment. Similarly, this notion can also be expressed in
terms of sets of desirable gambles: epistemic irrelevance means that the set of acceptable gambles for X 2 should
not change after learning the outcome of X 1 [49].
Example 5. We consider three urns with green and red balls. The ﬁrst urn has one red ball and one green ball.
In the second urn, we have two green balls, one red ball and two other balls of unknown color (they may be
red or green). In the third urn, we have one green ball, two red balls and two other balls of unknown color.
We select a ball from the ﬁrst urn. If it is green, then we select a ball from the second urn; if it is red, we
select a ball from the third urn. Let X 1 be the color of the ﬁrst ball selected and X 2 the color of the second ball.
We haveP ðthe second ball is greenjthe first ball is greenÞ ¼ 2=5;
P ðthe second ball is greenjthe first ball is redÞ ¼ 1=5and thus the ﬁrst experiment is not epistemically irrelevant to the second.4.2. Epistemic independence
The notion of epistemic irrelevance is an asymmetric notion, meaning that X 1 can be epistemic irrelevant
for X 2 while X 2 is not epistemic irrelevant for X 1. When X 1 and X 2 are epistemically irrelevant to each other,
we say that the two experiments are epistemically independent. This holds if and only if
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for all X2-measurable gambles f ;X1-measurable gambles g; x1 2 X1, and x2 2 X2.
In terms of sets of linear previsions, the notion of epistemic independence means that, for every x1 2 X1 and
x2 2 X2,fP 2ðjx1Þ : P 2 2MðP Þg ¼MðP 2Þ and fP 1ðjx2Þ : P 1 2MðP Þg ¼MðP 1Þ:
The behavioral interpretation of these deﬁnitions is that our sets of desirable gambles for either experiment do
not change after we learn the outcome of the other experiment.
Example 5(cont.). Assume now that in the third urn we also have two green balls, one red ball and two balls of
unknown color. We havePðthe second ball is greenjthe first ball is greenÞ ¼ 2=5 and
Pðthe second ball is greenjthe first ball is redÞ ¼ 2=5and similarlyPðthe second ball is redjthe first ball is greenÞ ¼ 1=5 and
Pðthe second ball is redjthe first ball is redÞ ¼ 1=5:Hence, the ﬁrst variable is epistemically irrelevant for the second. However,P ðthe first ball is greenjthe second ball is greenÞ ¼ 1=3;
(use the composition where we have two green balls in the second urn and 4 in the third one) while
Pðthe first ball is greenÞ ¼ 0:5. We conclude that the second variable is not epistemically irrelevant to the ﬁrst,
and therefore they are not epistemically independent.
This example provides an instance of the phenomena of dilation, where by updating our beliefs we make
them more imprecise. We indeed havePðthe first ball is greenjthe second ball is greenÞ ¼ 2=3 and
Pðthe first ball is greenjthe second ball is greenÞ ¼ 1=3;so knowing the color of the second ball makes our beliefs about the probability of drawing a red ball in the
ﬁrst urn change from being precise in 0.5 to belong to the interval ½1
3
; 2
3
. See [54] for more information about
dilation.
4.3. Independent envelopes
As we said before, in the classical case, if all the marginals are everywhere non-zero, then independence can
be expressed equivalently through the decomposition and the marginalization notions. These two properties,
however, are no longer equivalent in the imprecise case, and we can have two epistemically independent exper-
iments for which P ðx1; x2Þ 6¼ P 1ðx1Þ  P 2ðx2Þ for some x1 2 X1; x2 2 X2.
The ﬁrst two notions we have considered are based on extending the marginalization property to the impre-
cise case. Next, we introduce two conditions of independence which are based on the decomposition property.
These conditions are only applied to the extreme points of the setMðP Þ, because these keep all the informa-
tion about P and moreover it can be checked that a decomposition property cannot hold for all the elements of
the convex set MðP Þ.
We say that P is an independent envelope when every extreme point P of MðPÞ factorizes as P ¼ P 1  P 2,
where P 1 is the marginal distribution of P onX1 and P 2 is the marginal distribution of P onX2. This concept is
called independence in the selection in [10] and type-2 independence in [14].
It is easier to understand the ideas behind this notion if we consider the Bayesian sensitivity analysis inter-
pretation of our beliefs. Assume then that we have two experiments X 1;X 2, and that the probability modelling
the ﬁrst experiment belongs to some setMðP 1Þ, while the probability modelling the second experiment belongs
to another setMðP 2Þ. LetMðP Þ be the set of possible models for the behavior of the two experiments, taken
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means that each of these extreme points satisﬁes the classical notion of independence, in the sense that it
can be written as a product of its marginals.
Example 5(cont.). Assume now that in the ﬁrst urn we have one red ball, one green ball and one ball of
unknown color, and that in the second and third urns we have two green balls, one red ball and two balls of
unknown color. Then the variables X 1 and X 2 are epistemically independent: reasoning as in the example in
Section 4.2 we deduce that the color of the ﬁrst ball drawn is irrelevant for the second; conversely, we have that
P ðthe first ball is greenÞ ¼ P ðthe first ball is redÞ ¼ 13, and we deduce from the same example that the color of
the second ball is epistemically irrelevant for the ﬁrst.
Let P be the probability distribution associated to the following composition or the urns:Urn 1 Urn 2 Urn 3
2 red, 1 green 2 green, 3 red 4 green, 1 redIt is easy to check that this is an extreme point of the set of all the probability distributions compatible with
the available information (i.e., those associated to the possible compositions of the urns). However, it does not
factorize: we have for instanceP ðthe 2nd ball is green and the 1st is redÞ
¼ P ðthe 2nd ball is greenjthe 1st is redÞ  Pðthe 1st ball is redÞ ¼ 4
5
 2
3
¼ 8
15
;whileP ðthe 2nd ball is greenÞ  P ðthe 1st ball is redÞ ¼ 2
3
 2
3
¼ 4
9
:Hence, the set of possible models is not an independent envelope.
It is important to remark that this condition does not prevent the existence of some dependence between the
experiments: we could think for instance of two urns with one ball of the same color, but such that we do not
know if it is red or green. Then knowing the color of the ball in the ﬁrst urn completely determines the color of
the second, so there is no independence; however, the set of possible models is an independent envelope.
Another example, where we do not condition on events with lower probability zero, is given in next section.
4.4. Strong independence
Independence in the selection implies that MðP Þ is included in the convex hull of the product set
fP 1  P 2 : P 1 2MðP 1Þ; P 2 2MðP 2Þg;but the two sets are not necessarily equal. When we do have the equality, we say that the two experiments are
strongly independent. This is called type-3 independence in [14]. This equality means that if we consider a com-
patible model with our beliefs for each of the experiments, then we can construct their independent product
and we obtain a compatible model with the information we have about the behavior of the two experiments,
taken together. Hence, we do not have any information about the experiments that allows us to rule out any of
the combinations of the marginal distributions.
Note nevertheless that this information may be misleading: if we have no information at all about the two
experiments, we should consider the set of all previsions onLðX1 X2Þ, and this set satisﬁes strong indepen-
dence. Hence, strong independence implies that we have no information pointing towards some dependence
between the two experiments.
Example 6. Consider that we have two urns with one red ball, one green ball and one ball of unknown color,
either red or green, but the same in both cases. The set of possible compositions is given by the following table:
Urn 1 Urn 2
Composition 1 2 red, 1 green 2 red, 1 green
Composition 2 1 red, 2 green 1 red, 2 green
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the ball selected in the urn i, for i ¼ 1; 2. Let P be the lower prevision associated to ðX 1;X 2Þ, and let P i be its
marginals, representing our information about the outcome of X i, for i ¼ 1; 2. The associated lower prevision
P is the lower envelope of the previsions P ; P 0 that are determined by the compositions in the table above. Both
these previsions factorise, and from this we can deduce that P is an independent envelope. However, we do not
have strong independence: consider the previsions P 1; P 2 given by P 1ðredÞ ¼ 1=3; P 2ðredÞ ¼ 2=3. Then
P 1 P P 1 and P 2 P P 2. However, their product satisﬁes ðP 1  P 2Þðfirst red; second greenÞ ¼ 1=9 < 4=9 ¼
Pðfirst red; second greenÞ.
To summarize, and assuming that we are not conditioning on sets of probability zero, we have that Strong
independence ) Independence in the selection ) Epistemic independence ) Epistemic irrelevance, and all
these conditions are equivalent in the precise case.
There are other conditions of independence that can be considered for convex sets of probabilities, or
coherent lower previsions [10,14]. In particular, the important notion of conditional independence is studied
in [14]. On the other hand, it has also been studied how to extend the assessment given by marginal distribu-
tions under some assumption of independence. This is the basis for the notions of independent natural exten-
sion, and type-1 or type-2 products [71, Chapter 9], that we do not present here.
5. Relationships with other uncertainty models
In this section, we survey brieﬂy a number of mathematical models which are closely related to the Walley’s
behavioral theory of coherent lower previsions. We refer also to [71, Chapter 5] for some additional
discussions.
5.1. The work of de Finetti
As we mentioned in Section 1, the behavioral theory of coherent lower previsions is based on the behavioral
approach to subjective probability, championed by Bruno de Finetti [21,23]. In this approach, the probabilis-
tic information is represented by means of a prevision on a set of gambles. This prevision can be interpreted as
an expectation, but bearing in mind that it is deﬁned directly, without using integration. From a mathematical
point of view this distinction is not important in the precise case, because the restriction of the prevision to
events determines the prevision on all gambles using integration; however, lower previsions are in general
more informative than their restrictions to events, as we have said.
De Finetti deﬁned the prevision of a gamble f for a subject as the unique value l such that he accepts the
transaction cðf  lÞ for every real number c: this means that he is disposed to buy f for the price l and also to
sell it for the same price, so l is a fair price for the gamble f. Then a prevision is coherent when there is no
combination of acceptable transactions which leads to a sure loss. Mathematically, this is expressed bysup
Xn
i¼1
kiðfi  P ðfiÞÞP 0for every natural number n, real k1; . . . ; kn and gambles f1; . . . ; fn inK. It is easy to see that this condition is
equivalent to the coherence condition we have given in Eq. (2) for linear previsions.
Even if most of de Finetti’s work on coherent previsions can be embedded in Walley’s theory of coherent
lower and upper previsions, Walley’s work is not a generalization of de Finetti’s work, because there are sub-
stantial diﬀerences between the two:
	 The most fundamental one is that Walley does not require our subject to determine a fair price for all gam-
bles f in the domain. See [71, Section 5.7] for Walley’s arguments against the assumption of precision.
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slightly diﬀerent from Walley’s: he regards them as previsions deﬁned on a family of conditional events
EjH , where EjH is a logical entity which is true if both E and H are true, false if H is true and E is false,
and void if H is false.
	 Another diﬀerence between the two approaches is their regard towards the condition of conglomerability,
which is rejected by de Finetti in [23, Section 4.19]: he gives two examples where conglomerability is not
satisﬁed. One argument here is that full conglomerability rules out linear previsions which are not count-
ably additive (see Section 3.3 for a more precise formulation). The key of the matter, as Walley says in [71,
p. 327] is that8 Th
supx2su
really‘‘Those who insist on additivity and linearity must either reject conglomerability or the possibility of
extensions to larger domains.”5.2. The work of Williams
A ﬁrst approach to generalizing de Finetti’s work taking into account the presence of imprecision was con-
sidered by Peter Williams in [84–86] (see also [67] for a recent review of Williams’ work). It was also motivated
by the treatment of conditional previsions in de Finetti’s work. Williams deﬁnes a coherent conditional lower
prevision by means of a set of acceptable gambles, in the sense that P ðf jBÞ is deﬁned as the supremum value of
l such that IBðf  lÞ is an acceptable transaction for our subject. In particular, if we consider B ¼ X; P ðf jXÞ
agrees with Walley’s behavioral interpretation of a lower prevision (see [86] for a more detailed account of the
unconditional case). Similarly, P ðf jBÞ is deﬁned as the inﬁmum value of l such that the gamble IBðl f Þ is
acceptable for our subject, which in the case of unconditional lower previsions ðB ¼ XÞ becomes the inﬁmum
selling price for f.
In order to deﬁne coherence, he requires the set of acceptable gambles to satisfy conditions which are
slightly weaker than (D0)–(D3).8 He proves then that a necessary condition for coherence is thatsup
x2[n
i¼0Bi
Xn
i¼1
kiIBiðfi  P ðfijBiÞÞ  k0IB0ðf0  P ðf0jB0ÞÞ
" #
ðxÞP 0 ð13Þfor every natural number n, Bi included in X, non-negative real ki and fi in the domain of P ðjBiÞ for
i ¼ 0; . . . ; n. This condition is suﬃcient if we require the set of acceptable gambles to satisfy (D0)–(D3).
Let us compare this Condition, that we shall call W-coherence, with Walley’s notion of coherence for con-
ditional lower previsions (11). We see that, under Walley’s terminology (see Section 3.2), Condition (13)
corresponds to the particular case of Eq. (11) where the sets SiðfiÞ are ﬁnite for all i. Hence, if we consider
a number of conditional lower previsions P ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PðjBnÞ where B1; . . . ;Bn are ﬁnite partitions of X, then
they are coherent in the sense of Walley if and only if they are W-coherent. However, for arbitrary (not nec-
essarily ﬁnite) partitions B1; . . . ;Bn, Walley’s notion of coherence is stronger than that of Williams.
The use of W-coherence for conditional lower previsions has a number of technical advantages over Wal-
ley’s condition:
	 W-coherent conditional lower previsions are always lower envelopes of sets of W-coherent conditional lin-
ear previsions ([85, Theorem 2], see also [71, Section 8.1]), and as a consequence they can be given a Bayes-
ian sensitivity analysis interpretation.
	 We can always construct the smallest W-coherent extension of a W-coherent conditional lower prevision
[85, Theorem 1]. Moreover, this result can be generalized towards unbounded gambles [63].e diﬀerence is that he does not require a gamble f 6¼ 0 with infx2suppðf Þf ðxÞ ¼ 0 to be accepted, nor a gamble f 6¼ 0 with
ppðf ÞðxÞ ¼ 0 to be rejected, where suppðf Þ ¼ fx 2 X : f ðxÞ 6¼ 0g is the support of f. This is related also to Walley’s discussion of
desirable gambles [71, Appendix F].
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	 If we express the condition using Walley’s terminology, it assumes the ﬁniteness of the sets SiðfiÞ involved,
whereas for many statistical applications it is important to consider non-ﬁnite spaces and partitions.
	 It does not satisfy in general the conglomerability condition, as a consequence when we consider inﬁnite par-
titionswemay endupwith acceptable transactions (W-coherent)which incur in a sure loss [71, Example 6.6.9].
As a summary, Williams’ deﬁnition of coherence is a valid and interesting alternative to Walley, that avoids
some of the drawbacks of Walley’s approach to conditional lower previsions. Moreover, it seems to be better
suited for extending the theory to unbounded gambles. The choice between the two is based in whether we
accept full conglomerability as a rationality requirement, which means essentially that we assume countable
additivity of the involved previsions (but without measurability requirements): see Section 3.3 and [71, Section
6.9] for more details.
5.3. Kuznetsov’s work on interval-valued probabilities
In a relatively unknown book on interval-valued probabilities [40], the Russian mathematician V. Kuznetsov
established, in parallel toWalley, a theory of interval-valued probabilities and previsions which has many things
in common with the behavioral theory we have presented. Starting from some axioms which are equivalent to
Walley, he deduces many of the properties that can also be found in Walley’s book. He also obtains some inter-
esting limit results for coherent lower and upper previsions. The main diﬀerences between both theories are:
	 Kuznetsov does not consider the behavioral interpretation for coherent lower and upper previsions in terms
of buying and selling prices.
	 He makes some assumptions in the domains, and therefore we cannot consider previsions with arbitrary
domains as is the case with Walley’s theory.
	 His theory is valid for unbounded gambles, and the domain of his upper previsions contains at least those
gambles which are bounded above (and similarly, the domain of his lower previsions includes at least the
gambles which are bounded below).
	 When conditioning on a set B of lower probability zero and positive upper probability, he suggests taking
the limit on conditional dominating previsions, which give positive probability to B. This is related to the
notion of regular extension in Walley [71, Appendix K].
See [41,42] for two short papers in English presenting Kuznetsov’s work, and [12,66] for some works
derived from his theory.
5.4. Weischelberger’s F- and R-probabilities
Recently, Kurt Weischleberger and some of his colleagues have also established a theory of interval-valued
probabilities [79–81] that is more statistically oriented than Walley’s. This theory considers two non-additive
measures L 6 U determining the lower and upper bounds for our probabilities. The set of (ﬁnitely additive)
probabilities M that lie between L and U are called the structure determined by L;U .
L and U are said to determine an R-probability with structureM whenM 6¼ ;, and an F-probability when
L;U are the inﬁmum and the supremum of the probabilities in M, respectively. Hence, these concepts are
equivalent to the notions of avoiding sure loss and coherence for imprecise probabilities.
Weischleberger’s theory is more related to the classical works on probability theory, in the sense that it
focuses on probabilities instead of previsions and that it also makes some measurability assumptions that
are not present in Walley’s theory. Another diﬀerence is that Weischelberger’s work does not use a subjective
interpretation of lower and upper probabilities, and it allows to connect the notions of avoiding sure loss and
coherence with a frequentist interpretation of probability (see also [69] for another paper in this direction). The
treatment of conditional lower and upper probabilities and of the notion of independence is also diﬀerent [82].
See [2,82] for some recent work based on this theory.
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Next, we outline the main features of the Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence [57]. The origin of this theory
is in Dempster’s work on random sets, or measurable multi-valued mappings [24,25].
Let A be a ﬁeld of subsets of X, and consider a lower probability P :A! ½0; 1 that satisﬁes
P ð;Þ ¼ 0; P ðXÞ ¼ 1. P is said to be completely monotone if it is monotone and for any events A1; . . . ;An in
A and nP 2,P ð[ni¼1AiÞP
X
If1;...;ng
ð1ÞjI jþ1P ð\i2IAiÞ; ð14Þwhere jI j denotes the cardinality of the set I. A lower probability that satisﬁes Eq. (14) for all k 6 p is called p-
monotone. A complete monotone lower probability is then one that is n-monotone for every natural number
n. When X is a ﬁnite space, and the ﬁeldA is the class of all subsets of X, a completely monotone lower prob-
ability is called a belief function. A belief function is determined by its so-called basic probability assignment m,
which is given bymðAÞ ¼
X
BA
ð1ÞjABjP ðBÞ:Then P is given, for all A  X , by PðAÞ ¼PBAmðBÞ. The upper probability that we can generate from a com-
pletely monotone lower probability using conjugacy is said to be completely alternating, and, in the particular
case where X is ﬁnite, a plausibility function. The relationship between a plausibility function P and the basic
probability assignment m of its conjugate belief function P is P ðAÞ ¼PB\A 6¼;mðBÞ. The basic probability
assignment of a set A can be interpreted as the measure of belief that is committed exactly to A. Then
P ðAÞ would be our subject’s belief that the result of the experiment belongs to the set A, while P ðAÞ is the mea-
sure of his belief that the outcome of the experiment may belong to A (or, perhaps more clearly, the measure of
belief that does not rule out that the outcome is in A). This is the so-called evidential interpretation.
From the behavioral point of view, multi-valued mappings have been studied in [71, Section 4.3.5] and in [47].
On the other hand, 2- (and in particular completely-)monotone functionswere studied byWalley in [68]. Some of
his results generalize to the case where the domain is a lattice of events instead of a ﬁeld [18]. It can be checked [68]
that a 2-monotone lower probability is in particular coherent, and therefore so are n- and completely monotone
capacities. More generally, we can consider n-monotone lower previsions, which appeared in [5, Chapter 3] as
functionals between an Abelian semigroup and an Abelian group, and were studied from a behavioral point
of view in [17,18]. Hence, from a static point of view (without considering updating or combination of informa-
tion) Dempster–Shafer theory can be embedded into Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions.
One of the main features of the evidential theory, and Walley’s main point of criticism (see [71, Section 5.13]
and [74]) is Dempster’s Rule of Combination [24,57]. It is used to combine several belief functions which are
based on diﬀerent sources of information into one belief function. Let P 1; P 2 be two belief functions with basic
probability assignments m1;m2, respectively. The combined belief function P is the one related to the basic
probability assignmentmðCÞ ¼
X
A\B¼C
m1ðAÞm2ðBÞ; ð15Þwhere, if necessary, we normalize it by multiplying by1
X
A\B¼;
m1ðAÞm2ðBÞ
" #1
;which is a measure of the extent of the conﬂict between P 1 and P 2.
This rule of combination is only reasonable for Walley provided we make some additional assumptions on
the relationship between the experiments that underlie P 1; P 2 [71, Section 5.13.7]. In particular, the condition-
ing rule that we may derive from it may fail to produce conditional lower previsions which are coherent with
the unconditional ones. We may have to make some extra assumptions of conditional independence if we want
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criticism of this rule.
5.6. The game-theoretic approach to imprecise probabilities
We would like to conclude this section by making a brief summary of recent work by Shafer and Vovk [59],
where a connection is established between probability and ﬁnance through a game-theoretic approach to
coherent lower previsions. The ideas of this approach are roughly similar to the ones behind the behavioral
theory we have outlined: we also have here acceptable transactions and study whether they can lead to a sure
loss. There are, however, a number of important diﬀerences between the two: Shafer and Vovk consider a
game between two players, whereas Walley’s theory is focused on one subject who establishes buying and sell-
ing prices;9 there is no assumption of boundedness of the variables involved; and they focus on the conse-
quences and not so much on probability.
Let us make a short summary of the main ideas in this work. We refer to [59,60] for more details. Consider
a game between two players, called World and Skeptic, who play according to a certain protocol. The ﬁrst
player (World) can make a number of moves, where the next move may depend on his previous moves,
but not on the ones made by Skeptic. These moves can be represented in a tree, and we call a situation some
connected path in the tree that starts at the root of the tree.
In each situation t, Skeptic has a number of possible moves, and a gain function associated to the move he
makes and World’s next move, representing the change in Skeptic capital associated to these two moves. A
strategy is then a function determining Skeptic next move for each non-ﬁnal situation in the tree representing
World’s moves, and the associated capital if he starts the game with zero capital is his capital process.
Under this interpretation, Shafer and Vovk deﬁne upper and lower prices for real variables. The upper price
for a variable f in a non-ﬁnal situation t is the lowest price at which Skeptic can buy the variable f at the end of
the game, no matter what moves World makes, using some strategy. The lower price for a variable f in a non-
ﬁnal situation t can be given an analogous interpretation using conjugacy.
A gambling protocol is called a probability protocol when the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
(PP1) The set of possible moves for Skeptic in any situation t is a convex cone.
(PP2) For each non-ﬁnal situation, Skeptic’s gain function is linear with respect to Skeptic’s moves, for any
move of World ﬁxed.
It is called coherent when for each non-ﬁnal situation and each possible move s of Skeptic there is another
move w of World such that the gain associated to ðs;wÞ is non-positive.
For many of their developments Shafer and Vovk decompose World into multiple players. They consider for
instance Reality and Forecaster, where Forecaster determines for each non-ﬁnal situation the set of possible
moves and the gain function for Skeptic, while Reality determines themove ofWorld. Shafer and Vovk establish
a number of limit results, such as weak and strong laws of large numbers, for coherent probability protocols.
Under the terminology we have considered throughout this survey, our subject would take the role of Fore-
caster, in the sense that he establishes the supremum buying prices for all gambles in the domain. Then, we
check the coherence of these prices using the roles of Skeptic (selecting some gambles in the domain) and Real-
ity (determining the outcome of the experiment, that is, the value x in X). Walley’s notion of coherence means
that the buying prices established by Forecaster should not be exploitable by Skeptic in order to assure himself
a gain, no matter how World moves.
We see then that, although some of the concepts used by Shafer and Vovk are similar to the ones in Wal-
ley’s theory of coherent lower previsions (the behavioral interpretation, the notion of coherence, etc.), there
are also diﬀerences between the two approaches, like the use of two players and the extension to unbounded
gambles. It is therefore interesting that Shafer and Vovk’s work on coherent probability protocols has been
recently connected to Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions in [19]. It has been proven that for every9 A two player model is already present in [61].
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ing prices, and vice versa. See [19] for more information. In this sense, in spite of some of their diﬀerences, the
results from one theory can be embedded into the other.10
6. Applications
Let us give some comments now on the use of the theory of coherent lower previsions in other contexts.
Since the origins of subjective probability are in decision making, it is not really surprising that much of
the work made on practical uses of coherent lower previsions, which stem from subjective probability theory,
is related to decision theory. Indeed, imprecise probabilities can be seen as a more realistic model for practical
decision problems, because they allow us to treat some of the most common problems that appear in practice:
lack of available information, conﬂicting sources of beliefs, and diﬃculties in eliciting expert’s opinions.
The theory of coherent lower previsions, in diﬀerent forms, has been employed in a number of applications,
in diﬀerent frameworks such as the environmental [70] or the bio-medical [64,72,90]. One of the consequences
of the use of sets of probabilities will be that sometimes we cannot decide which of two alternatives must be
preferred, something which is to be expected on the other hand in the case of little information. Another fea-
ture is that there are many possible ways of generalizing the principle of maximum expected utility to coherent
lower previsions, such as E-admissibility, interval dominance, C-maximinity and maximality, etc. We refer to
[65] for an overview of the diﬀerent criteria, and to [56] for a comparison of E-admissibility and C-maximinity.
There have also been several studies connecting the behavioral theory of coherent lower previsions with dif-
ferent aspects of statistics [73,75]. One of the most important is the work in [73], where Walley deﬁned the so-
called Imprecise Dirichlet Model. This is a model for inference which relates past and future observations
about some variables. See also [3,76] for additional information about this model. The Imprecise Dirichlet
Model has been applied in diﬀerent contexts, such as classiﬁcation [1,90,91], reliability analysis [9] or game
theory [52]. See also [16,89] for further theoretical developments on this subject.
Finally, coherent lower previsions have also been used for dealing with uncertainty scenarios in climate
change [39] and forestry [28].
7. Strengths and challenges
The results mentioned in this paper constitute an attempt to overview the main features of the behavioral
theory of coherent lower previsions. As a summary, the main virtues of this theory are:
1. It is better suited for situations where the available information does not justify the use of a precise prob-
ability distribution.
2. It encompasses most of the other generalizations considered in the literature (belief functions, 2-monotone
capacities, coherent lower probabilities). This is done mainly in two ways:
	 By focusing on the behavior towards variables (gambles), and therefore on the notion of expectation,
without going through the behavior on events ﬁrst.
	 By moving away from the measurability requirements on classical probability theory and considering
previsions for arbitrary sets of gambles.3. It provides a behavioral interpretation that leads naturally to decision making, and it can at the same time
be given a sensitivity analysis representation in some cases.
Nevertheless, the theory of coherent lower previsions has a number of challenges that need to be studied in
more detail:10 The (possible) unboundedness of the variables in the models is overcome in the case of coherent lower previsions by working with sets
of (really) desirable gambles, instead of almost-desirable ones [19, Sections 3 and 4].
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informative inferences.
2. The theory is established for bounded random variables, or gambles, and the generalization towards
unbounded random variables is not straightforward.
3. Like other theories, it assumes the linearity of the utility scale, something which may not be reasonable in
practice.11
4. Walley’s notion of natural extension of conditional lower previsions has some undesirable properties, which
do not seem to be resolvable without giving up on conglomerability.
5. Computing with coherent lower previsions in practice means often solving non-linear problems, whence for
big problems the computational costs may be high.
6. There have been until now relatively few applications, and more are needed in order to eﬀectively compare
the applicability of this theory with classical tools.
7. More generally, we need to develop tools to be able to compare the eﬀectiveness of precise and imprecise
approaches in a number of situations.
8. There are several notions of independence as well as diﬀerent optimality criteria, and it is not always clear
which of them is better suited for each situation.
9. From the theoretical point of view there are a number of notions and results from classical probability the-
ory which have not been generalized, such as ergodic theorems.
These problems constitute the main avenues for future research in the theory.
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